The victim is unlikely to realise that the malicious page’s objective is toĭe-anonymise her on some unrelated service
#SLACK DOWNLOAD BUG CODE#
Unless she’s tech-savvy and inspects the source code of the malicious page, Than simply sharing some unique link in a direct message (DM) to the victim and This privacy attack is more powerful, in terms of stealth and scalability, Is the current visitor of the malicious page logged in as on Twitter?Īll the malicious page has to do is forge requests to one or more shared imagesĪnd somehow detect, through XSLeak techniques, whether access by the current Then an attacker who knows the resulting URL can abuse itĪlthough the attacker doesn’t control the server at the end of that URL,Ī malicious page of their design can act as an oracle for questions like allows authenticated access to a shared image via the same URL.relies on cookies for session management, and.Image-sharing functionality for de-anonymising users across origins. My eye fell upon some interesting research conducted at TU DarmstadtĮntitled Leaky Images: Targeted Privacy Attacks in the Web,ĭemonstrates how, under certain conditions, attackers can abuse a service’s Leaky images ¶Ī few months ago, as I was catching up on the latest research about XSLeaks, Nevertheless, the study of XSLeaks is interesting in its own right,īecause it naturally leads to a deeper understanding of browser misfeaturesĪnd implementation quirks. Reward reports of XSLeaks only on a case-by-case basis. Whereas others, such as Google’s and Twitter’s, Many bug-bounty programmes outright dismiss the impact of XSLeaks as negligible, You likely won’t get rich quickly by making XSLeaks the focus of your infosec work. To another are collectively known as cross-site leaks,īug-bounty hunters, don’t get too excited: The techniques consisting in working around the SOP to leak data from one origin The barrier between origins is in practice more porous than meets the eye. The Same-Origin Policy, browser security’s cornerstone,ĭoes provide tight isolation between different Web origins,Īnd further isolation mechanisms have been implemented over the years īut security researchers have demonstrated, Similar attacks are possible within Web browsers. You may remember how, back in 2014, MIT researchers were able toįrom the footage captured by a high-speed camera trained on a bag of crisps. Impact includes leaking the victim’s IP address and browser fingerprint,Īs well as facilitating spearphishing attacks.An attacker can de-anonymise a fellow member of their Slack workspaceĪmong n others in no more than O(log n) HTTP requests.
Linked to its file-sharing functionality.
I discovered a navigation-related XSLeak technique that resists SameSite=Lax.This package supports Python 3.6 and higher.In this post, I show how a malicious member of a Slack workspace can exploitĪ cross-site leak in Slack’s file-sharing functionality in order to efficientlyĭe-anonymise fellow workspace members when they visit the attacker’s website The Python module documents are available at Installation ¶
Verify incoming requests from the Slack API servers.Ĭonstruct UI components using easy-to-use builders. Listen for incoming messages and a limited set of events happening in Slack, using WebSocket. Utilize the SCIM APIs for provisioning and managing user accounts and groups. Setup the authentication flow using V2 OAuth, OpenID Connect for Slack apps. Receive and send messages over Socket Mode connections. Send a message using Incoming Webhooks or response_url Send data to or query data from Slack using any of over 200 methods. They are small and powerful when used independently, and work seamlessly when used together, too. This SDK offers a corresponding package for each of Slack’s APIs. Each Slack API delivers part of the capabilities from the platform, so that you can pick just those that fit for your needs. The Slack platform offers several APIs to build apps.
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